FACTORS IN FREIGHT CAR SUPPLY by Hutchinson, T.Q.
SOUTHERN JOURNAL  OF AGRICULTURAL  ECONOMICS  December,  1971
FACTORS IN FREIGHT CAR SUPPLY
T. Q. Hutchinson*
INTRODUCTION  remainder  of the year.
The  Wall  Street Journal,  the Great  Plainsman  and  CAR SUPPLY
other  publications  tell  us  that  there  is  a  rail  car
shortage.  The dual purpose  of this article is to demon-  In  the  shortrun  the  supply  of  rail  cars  can  be
strate  that  the  shortage  is  one  of rail  service  rather  considered  fixed.  Thus, it might appear that an inven-
than  rolling  stock  and  to  examine  several  of  the  tory  of  rail  cars  would be  indicative  of the shortrun
mechanisms  available  to increase  the  quantity of rail  supply  of cars.  In the period  1958  to  1968, the total
service,  number  of  railroad-owned  freight  cars  declined  16
percent  [1].  Rail cars, however are not homogeneous
CAR DEMAND  as  to  size  or  type;  therefore,  aggregative  inventories
are a poor basis for evaluation of rail car supply.
The  demand for rail service is difficult to quantify;
however,  the Interstate  Commerce  Commission (ICC)  An  examination  of the  3  car  types most  suitable
has  provided  us  with  estimates  of the  degree  of car  for  carrying  dry  bulk  commodities  shows  that  the
shortage  (Table  1)  [10].  It has found that the freight  inventory  of general service  boxcars  declined  39 per-
car  shortage has been concentrated in  three  car types,  cent  between  1958  and  1968  [1].  Special  service
boxcars,  gondola  cars,  and  hopper  cars.  The  ICC's  boxcars  and  covered  hopper  cars,  however,  showed
estimates  of the  shortage  are  in  terms  of car  owner-  increases  of  342  and  106  percent  (from  bases  of
ship  and  do  not  indicate  the  areas  where  apparent  52,600 and  58,800 cars)  in  the same  period. These 3
demand  exceeds  available  supply.  In fact, the Central  car  types  are  mutually  substitutable  when  hauling
Western  and  Northwestern districts are  shown to have  bulk  commodities  and  their  total  number  has  de-
adequate  ownership,  yet,  these  are the  areas in which  dined only about 9 percent.
demand  for  rail  cars  most  frequently  exceeds  avail-
able supply [8].  Even  on  a  disaggregated  basis,  the number  of rail
cars is  not the best  measure of actual car supply. The
Boxcars  show  the  greatest  deficits.  These  deficits  aggregate  capacity,  by  car  type,  offers  a  closer
are  regional  and are  concentrated  in  the Eastern  and  approximation  of the supply  of rail  services available
Southern  United  States. Gondola  car and hopper  car  to meet shipper demand than does numbers.
deficits  are  about  equally  large  and  concentrated  in
the  Southern  and  Western  United  States. It can  also  Aggregate  capacity  of  all  rail  cars  declined  very
be  seen that  the shortage  tended  to be growing, even  slightly between  1958  and  1968  (0.1%)  [18].  Of the
allowing for the 1965 estimates being based on poten-  3  car  types  considered  herein,  (general  service  box-
tial traffic.  cars,  special  service  boxcars and covered hopper cars)
the  capacity  of  general  service  boxcars  showed  the
In  a  second  document  in  the  proceedings,  refer-  largest  decrease  (34.5%).  Special  service  boxcars,
enced  above,  the  ICC  showed  that  the  car  shortage  however,  increased 340.7 percent and covered  hopper
was especially  acute  for  general  service  boxcars and  cars  increased  151.3  percent.  Aggregate  capacity  of
quite  seasonal  [11].  Shortages  in  the  September  to  the  3  car  types under study increased 3,548,200 tons
February  period  averaged  about  twice  those for  the  (8.9%).
*Industry economist, Economic  Research  Service, USDA, Washington,  D. C.
167TABLE  1.  ESTIMATED  ADDITIONAL  (ABOVE  1965  OWNERSHIP)  CARS  NEEDED  IN  EACH  YEAR
SHOWN,  BY DISTRICT AND  CAR  TYPEa
Car type
District and year  Box cars  Gondola cars  Hopper cars
1,000 cars
Eastern
1963  10.0  b  e
1964  4.0  b  3.0
1965  16.0d  b  c
Allegheny
1963  12.0  e  e
1964  13.0  e  e
1965  16.0d  e  e
Southern
1963  21.0  13.0  5.0
1964  18.0  14.2  1.7
1965  34.0d  14.0d  10.0 d
Northwestern
1963  e  16.0  17.0
1964  e  17.0  18.0
1965  e  17.0d  18.0 d
Central Western
1963  e  4.8  11.0
1964  e  5.7  13.0
1965  e  5.5d  14.0d
Southwestern
1963  17.0  2.6  0.6
1964  19.0  2.4  0.3
1965  28.0d  2 . 4d  2.4 d
Total deficiencies  shown
1963  60.0  36.4  33.0
1964  54.0  39.3  36.0
1965  94.0d 38.9 d 44.0d
aBased on Ex Parte 241, Investigation of Adequacy of Freight Car Ownership, 323 ICC,  decided June  18,  1964.
bSurplus exists.
CNo estimate  given.
dBased  on potential rather than actual loadings.
eSufficient supply.
168Freight  car capacity  measured  at a single  point in  Circuity  also differs  between cars  in local and cars
time is still not the best measure of freight car supply.  in  interline  service  with  significantly  more  circuity
Clearly,  a  car  can  be  offered  for  service  more  than  shown for the latter service  [7]:
once  a year.  The effective  shortrun supply of rail cars
is,  therefore,  influenced  by both the aggregate  freight  Circuity
car  capacity and by the manner in which this capacity  Local  Interline
is  utilized.  Factors  such  as  average  speed,  average  Type of Car  Percent
daily  hours  of  utilization,  time  spent  loading  and
unloading  and others all have an impact on the short-  Box, general service  10.9  17.2
run effective  car supply.  Box,  special service  7.8  18.0
Gondola  11.0  18.4
Between  1959  and  1967,  the  average  speed  of  Hopper, open top  9.9  15.4
trains  increased  1.1  to  20.3  miles per hour  [18].  In  Hopper, closed top  10.2  19.7
the  same  period,  the  average  distance  traveled  by  a  All types  9.7  16.4
freight  car  increased  nearly  8  miles  per day  to  51.5
miles.  These  figures can be used to determine  that the  The  net  result  of  the  supply  factors  previously
time  during which  a  car was utilized  (moved  toward  discussed  can  be  determined  by  comparing  the
some  destination)  remained  nearly  unchanged  at  2.5  revenue  ton miles generated by railroads in 1958 with
hours  per day, assuming that average speed is directly  those  in  1968.  Revenue  ton  miles  increased  from
related  to  average  distance.  Another  factor especially  551.7  billion in  1958  to 744.5  billion  in  1968  [12].
worthy  of attention  is that the number of unservice-  Although  the  total  number of freight  cars  decreased
able  freight  cars  decreased  3.1  percentage  points  15.7  percent and the aggregate capacity decreased 0.1
between  1959  and  1967 when about 5 percent  of the  percent  in  the  same  period,  output  as  measured  by
railroad  owned  fleet  was  undergoing  or  awaiting  revenue  ton miles  increased  34.9  percent.  It appears
repairs.  that  the  small  increases  in  car  utilization  and  the
decrease  in  the  proportion  of  unusable  cars  have
Routing practices  also  have an effect on the effec-  outweighed  the  reductions  in  number  of  cars  and
tive  shortrun  car  supply.  In  most  instances,  the  aggregate  capacity.  This,  in  turn,  indicates  that  the
shortest  possible  route  will  require  the least  time  to  so-called  car  shortage  is  not so much  a deficiency  in
complete  the shipment  and would  tend to maximize  the  number  of rail cars  as it  is a  low level of utiliza-
the  effective  rail  car  supply.  Section  15(8)  of  the  tion and poor allocation of the available fleet.
Interstate  Commerce  Act  gives  shippers  the  right  to
select the routing for rail shipments.  In the absence of  In  the words of the ICC,  '. ..  the . ..  problem is
shipper's  routings,  Section  15(4)  of  the  Interstate  not so  much  the availability of sufficient cars to fill
Commerce  Act  prohibits,  in general,  requiring  a  rail-  current shippers'orders  as the use ofthe cars within a
road  to  embrace  substantially  less  than  its  entire  region"/15].
length in  a  through  route.  This prohibition  results  in
routes  of  greater  than  the  minimum  length.  Under  The  Commission  added:  "Even in  regions where
existing statutes, there is neither administrative  means  the  supplying of  the  type  of car to  fill shippers'
nor economic  incentive  to reduce  circuity in routing.  requests involved  the greatest delay,  availability in
general was at least twice the current  orders "[15].
The  ICC has established a measure of the extent  to
which  actual  route  mileages  exceed  mileages  of the  In  view  of  the  relative  ease  with  which  railroad
shortest  practical  routes.  This  measure,  the  circuity  equipment  can  be  financed,  some  observers  of  the
factor,  increased  from  13  percent  in  1950  to  15  situation  seem  doubtful  that  a  serious  absolute
percent  in  1964  [7].  For  1964,  circuity  differed  shortage  of  equipment  exists.  According  to  Gilbert
among car types as follows  [7]:  Burch:
Type of Car  Circuity percent  "Since  locomotives  and cars can be repossessed,
financing them  is  almost risk-free ...  So during the
Box, general service  16.2  past decade the carriers  spent an average of more than
Box,  special service  16.8  $900  million  a year on  locomotives  and cars. But
Gondola  16.4  other investments,  such as  new  yards and line re-
Hopper, open top  13.1  visions,  had  to  come largely out of cash flow,  and
Hopper, covered  17.5  amounted to only $300 million a year"[3].
All types  14.9
These  other  investments  would  tend  to  improve
The  circuity  factor  for  shortage  category  cars  is  utilization  of rolling stock and their lack would cause
above  average  for all but the open hopper car type.  utilization  to  decline.  In  fact,  adding  rolling  stock
169without  commensurate  additions  to  other  facilities  quiring  only the return of foreign cars  to their owners




Railroads  have  two  sources  of  operating  income,
Either  increasing  the number  of cars  in inventory  freight charges  and  per diem payments. The latter are
or  increasing  the  utilization  of cars,  or both,  might  the  rental charged  by  an  owning  railroad  for the use
alleviate the  car shortage.  The available  evidence  sug-  of  a  car  by  a  using  road.  Per  diem  payments  are,
gests  that rail  service  is more responsive  to changes in  therefore,  the internal  economic incentives  that allo-
utilization  than  to  changes  in  car  inventory.  The  cate the  available  rail car  supply  among railroads and
probable  impact  on rail  car utilization  should,  there-  also  play  a  role  in  internal  investment  decisions.  If
fore, be the chief criterion for assessment of proposed  they are  set uneconomically  high,  foreign  cars will  he
solutions to the  car shortage.  quickly  returned  to  their  owners  at  considerable
expense.  If  too  low,  foreign  cars  will  be  retained
Demurrage  indefinitely.
Loading  and  unloading  time,  which  is  subject  to  Through  1968,  the  ICC  did  not  intend  per diem
control  by  the  users,  accounts  for about  18 percent  payments  to be  car  rental charges.  Instead  they were
of  a  rail  car's  life  [2].  Conceptually,  increasing  intended  to  represent  an  equitable  sharing  of  car
demurrage  charges  would  reduce  the  amount  of time  ownership  costs  [4] . The revenue potential of the car
spent  in  loading  and  uliludding.  Between  1966  and  was not considered.  This  philosophy  helps to explain
1967,  minimum  demurrage  charges  increased  from  the  structure  of  per diem rates  and the  existing pat-
$5.00  to $7.50 per day. In the same period, Boles and  tern of car ownership.
Gerald  show  the  time  spent  loading  and  unloading
decreasing  0.2  percentage  points  [2].  Boles  and  Between  1902  and  1964,  a uniform  system of flat
Gerald,  however,  indicate  that  their  data  will  not  per  diem  rates,  ranging  from  $0.20  per  car  day  in
support any conclusion  as to the impact of demurrage  1902  to $2.88 in  1963, existed.  In  1964, a multi-level
on  performance  [2].  It  is  clear,  nevertheless,  that  a  per  diem system  was instituted under which per diem
modest improvement  in utilization by railroads which  rates  varied  directly  with  the value  of  the  car.  Cars
control a  car  for 82  percent of its life would increase  with  a  value  of $1,000  or  less commanded  a  rate  of
effective  car  supply  more  than  would  a  similar  im-  $2.16  per  day.  Cars  valued  in  excess  of  $20,000
provement by shippers  and receivers.  commanded  a daily rate of $7.74.
Car Service Rules  With  per  diem  reflecting  only  the  cost  of owner-
ship,  railroads might  be expected  to purchase cars for
In  October  1967,  a majority  of the Association of  interline service  with  ownership  costs equal to or less
American  Railroads'  membership adopted a set of car  than the per diem rate.  The flat per diem rate would,
service  rules.  Essentially,  these  same  rules  were  therefore,  tend  to result in  the purchase  of relatively
adopted by the ICC in Ex Parte  241  (1969). The rules  inexpensive  equipment  [6].  This  tendency  would  be
require,  in brief, that foreign cars be returned to their  especially  evident  in  roads  originating  large  volumes
owners  with  reasonable  expediency.  During  the  of  interline  traffic.  Shifting  to  a  multilevel  system
course  of the hearings and subsequently, both carriers  would  tend  to  result  in  the  purchase  of  relatively
and  shippers  opposed  adoption  of  mandatory  car  expensive  cars.  This  hypothesis  is  supported  by  the
service  rules  [17].  A  check  made  in  October  1965  available  data.  Between 1960 and  1963,  an average  of
showed  that  50  percent  of  the  cars  checked  were  10,588  relatively  expensive  cars  were  purchased
loaded  in  violation  of  the  two  basic  rules.  Certain  annually  [14].  For the  period  1964-67,  the  annual
carriers  were  found in violation at certain stations for  rate  of  purchase  for  expensive  cars  increased  240
from  90 to 94 percent of loadings  [11] . As voluntary  percent.  General  purpose  rail  cars  were  acquired  at
compliance  seems  lacking,  it  is  doubtful  that  the  the  average  rate  of 24,899 cars  per year  in  1960-63.
existing car  service  rules can  be  relied upon to return  Their  rate  of acquisition  increased  only  15  percent
foreign  cars to their owners unless the ICC's ability to  following institution  of the multilevel per diem rates.
police  the  business  community  is  greatly  increased.  These  data  also  suggest  that the  response  to  changes
Even  where  adequate  policing  is available,  as  in  the  in per  diem rates  is  quite  rapid and that the per diem
case  of the  ICC's car  service  orders, returning  cars to  structure  is  an  appropriate  mechanism  for  adjusting
owning  roads  does  not  necessarily  result  in  an opti-  the mix of rail cars.
mum distribution  of the  car fleet.  There  is no reason
to  believe  that  car  ownership  will  reflect  shipper  In  August  1968,  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com-
demand  in  the  shortrun.  Service  rules  or  orders  re-  mission  instituted  a  system  of  car  rental  charges
170which  included  both  daily  and  mileage  charges  [5].  rates  met Grunfeld's second  criterion.  In addition  to
The concept of variable  charges, depending on the age  stimulating  investment  in  high cost  equipment,  such
and  original  cost  of  the  car,  was  retained.  These  multilevel  rates would  also  seem  likely  to  bring im-
charges  ranged from  $0.63 per day and  1.47 cents per  proved  utilization  of such equipment.  It is  question-
mile  for cars  over 30  years old costing  $1,000 or less  able,  however,  that  the  multilevel  per  diem  rates in
to  $10.22  per  day  and  4.60  cents  per  mile  for cars  effect  since  1964 have had such an effect.  Since  1965,
under six  years old costing  from $39,000 to $41,000  the  ratio  of  car  loadings  to  number  of  cars  for
[5].  There  are  no quantitative  data available  at this  covered  hopper  cars has varied between  19.51  (1968)
time  with  which  to  assess  the  impact  of  these  and  20.72  (1966)  [13].  Since  the  ratio  stood  at
changes.  Logic  would  indicate  that  daily  charges  19.01  in  1963,  little change  is evident.  The incentive
would  tend  to  cause  foreign cars to move off of the  per  diems,  however,  tend  to  better  meet  both  of
using line.  Mileage  charges would tend to keep empty  Grunfeld's criterion  than did year around stable rates
foreign cars  at rest.  There  is  some talk in the railroad  and  (in season)  will  tend to counteract  the  relatively
industry  that  the  effect  of  the  time  and  mileage  high  mileage  charges.  The  order  establishing  the
charges  has been  to hold low value  cars at destination  incentive  per diems  requires  net revenue  from incen-
points.  Indeed,  one  group  of railroads  have  charged  tives  to  be  invested  in  plain  boxcars.  No  other  per
that the time-mileage  concept will intensify the exist-  diem  plan  has  had  any  direct  effect  on  the  level  of
ing  car  shortage  [16].  There  is  at least  some  surface  investment  in rolling stock.
validity  to this charge.  Let  us assume  that  an empty
30-year  old boxcar  in the  $0 to $1,000 bracket must  In addition,  the Interstate  Commerce  Commission
travel  1,000  miles  in  order  to  return  to  its  owner's  has made  it  clear that they remain  willing to modify
system.  Thus,  the  using railroad  must pay $14.70  in  the  rules  concerning  incentive  per  diems  [9].  Such
mileage  charges.  The  daily  charge  for holding  the car  willingness  seems likely  to allow market factors to be
is  only  $0.63  or  about  4  percent  of  the  mileage  reflected  into  the  car  rental  pricing  structure  more
charge  which  is essentially  a fixed cost. The addition-  readily  and  more  rapidly  than  before.  The  effect of
al  cost  of holding  the  foreign  car for a  time  in hopes  the  incentive per diem plan remains to be seen.
of obtaining a return load  is,  therefore  nominal.  The
car  in  the example  could be held for  135  days before  CONCLUSIONS
the total  charges reached  $100. Assuming further that
the  car  was  of  average  capacity,  53  tons,  a  rate  of  It  is  clear  that  per  diem  payments  play  a crucial
only  $2.00  per  ton  would  be  required  to  show  a  role  in  the  car  investment  decision  process  and  an
gross  profit  after  retaining  the  car  for  135  days.  equally critical  role  in the level of car utilization. The
Since  plain  boxcars tend to be both relatively  old and  level  of per  diem payments  is  at least as  critical and
relatively  low cost, the  1968  car rental charges  seem  possibly  more  critical  than  the  system  under  which
likely  to have  resulted  in somewhat  lower utilization  they  are  assessed.  Not only  is  the absolute level criti-
of shortage category  cars.  cal,  but  the relative  level  among  car types for  multi-
level charges  and  between  time and  mileage bases  are
Incentive Per Diem  System  also  important.  Payments  set  either  too high or too
low  will result in:  (1)  undesirable  allocations of exist-
Grunfeld  proposed  criteria  for  an  effective  struc-  ing  supply  and  (2)  undesirable  investments in  cars.
ture  of  per  diem  payments:  (1)  Per  diem  charges  In  view  of  the  continuing  car  shortage,  it  seems
should  reflect  seasonal  and cyclical  levels  of demand  reasonable  to conclude  that, thus far, none of the per
so that  railroads  are indifferent  as to whether its cars  diem payments have been at the right level.
are  operated  on  the home  line or  a  foreign  line.  (2)
Per  diem  charges  should  reflect  the costs of owning  The  incentive  per  diem  system  seems  to  be  the
the  car in question  [6].  most  desirable  of the per diem systems yet  adopted.
Its  impacts  on  all  areas  of the  problem,  within  the
In  an  order,  dated  April  28,  1970, the  Interstate  railroad's  control,  allows  seasonal  market  factors  to
Commerce  Commission  instituted  a system  of incen-  be  reflected  into  the  pricing  structure  and  takes
tive  per diems  to take effect  on June  1, 1970.  From  ownership  costs into account.  The combination of an
September  through  February,  this  system  adds  an  incentive  per  diem  system,  demurrage  charges,  car
additional  charge  for  unequipped  boxcars  to  the  service  rules and service  orders seems  likely to be the
existing  daily  charges.  Incentive  charges  vary  in  the  best solution available  at this time.
same  fashion as the  multilevel  per diem charges.  For
example,  for a  car  in cost  bracket $0  to  $1,000  over  A Proposed  Solution
30  years  old,  the  incentive  charge  is $0.04 per day.
For a  car in  cost bracket  $39 to  $41,000 5 years  old  In addition  to seasonal variations,  demand  for rail
or  less,  the  incentive  charge  is  $12.98  per  day. The  cars  seems  likely  to  show  regional  and  short  term
multilevel per diem (varying with the value of the car)  cyclical  variations.  It is  unlikely  that the  necessarily
171cumbersome  machinery  of national  regulations  can  form  of a  bid  or  offer.  The  bidding  railroad  would
ever effectively  cope with short term conditions. The  offer  an  additional  payment  over  and  above  the
only  complete  solution  would  seem  to  lie  in  a  free  established  per diem charge.  Similarly,  a railroad with
market  for the use  of rail cars  capable  of responding  surplus  cars  would  offer  to make  them available  for
on a daily basis or more  frequently.  an  additional payment.  This additional  charge  would
be  paid  to  the owning  line for the  time  that the  car
Despite  the  appeal  of a  free market, it  is unlikely  remained  on  the bidder's line.  This restrictive feature
that  such  a  market  could  be  established  under  the  is made necessary  by the inability of intermediate  and
current law,  since  a market  implies  voluntary partici-  terminating  carriers to refuse  a properly tendered car.
pation.  Intermediate  and terminating rail  carriers  are  They  should  not,  therefore,  be  bound  by  a  price
not free  to participate  or abstain from the market for  which  they  had  no  voice  in  establishing.  Under  the
rail  cars  since  they  must  accept  any  car tendered  to  proposed  system,  intermediate  and  terminating  car-
them under  a  through  route.  Nor  could  they, under  riers would  be  liable  only for the car rental payments
current  law,  refuse  to  establish  through  routes.  established by the ICC.
Equity  seems  to  dictate  that  intermediate  and  ter-
minating carriers  should  reimburse  a car owner for its
use.  Since  the  willing  price  of  intermediate  and  Even though  the commission does  not hold incen-
terminating  carriers for the use of foreign cars may be  tive  per diems  as  a sole  and final remedy, neither is it
well  below  the  costs  of  ownership  and  since  they  suggested  that an additional  increment will  solve the
must  accept  any  car  properly  tendered,  it  appears  car  shortage  problem.  Optimizing  the  size,  mix  and
that they must be coerced  into such payments. Thus,  distribution  of the rail car  fleet can only be obtained
a  system  of uniform  (with  regard  to  time,  car type  under  a  pricing  structure  which  reflects  short  term
and ownership costs) charges must be continued.  shipper  demand.  The  additional  increment  would,
however,  tend  to  reflect  short  term  market  condi-
A  partial  solution  might  be  an  additional  incre-  tions and,  as such,  would be  another step in the right
ment added to  the existing  per diem structure  in the  direction.
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